Last updated: January 21, 2021
Evidence of mass detention (almost one-fourth of adults in a village) from a work report
Two policemen brought to Xinjiang to deal with huge arrest volume talks about their experiences, noting massive overcrowding
A teacher describes an orphanage-preschool for toddlers with both parents detained
A general overview of fanghuiju work and village-level policy efforts in a particular village
A document covering a village where 11% of the population has been detained or imprisoned
The above are translated and annotated posts from social media by Chinese cadres and affiliated workers themselves. More will be added as time goes on. If you follow professor Timothy Grose on Twitter, you'll see these type of social media posts by cadres and others in Xinjiang are not rare; most of the above were discovered by him. Others have used Chinese social media as part of investigations into Xinjiang as well, such as Le Monde in its mini-documentary released in January 2021.
The Party campaign to remold Xinjiang through coercive detention and reeducation does not stop outside the camps. Party cadres from all over China have been sent to Xinjiang to help educate and enlighten people in Xinjiang, though no one seems to ask if that’s what people in Xinjiang actually want (hint: you probably can’t say otherwise, because that would be one of the many broad signs of extremism). What these people do, say, and hear often gets posted on social media, providing a unique view into what's happening in Xinjiang.
The cadre dispatch programs can be in the form of temporary homestay programs, wherein predominantly Han cadres move into Uyghur houses for a period of time and take notes on their behavior, watching out for “extremist” inclinations. (You can read more about this process in this article from Darren Byler, who spent years in Xinjiang for his doctoral research and interviewed Han cadres themselves in 2018.) They can also take the form of village work teams assigned to similar functions at a community level, and who additionally conduct construction, poverty relief, and other related work during their terms. A 2017 webpage from the Xinjiang government claimed over 200,000 cadres had been dispatched between 2014 and then as part of these programs.
Overall, these posts represent additional primary evidence that complements existing research and testimony.